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When the rights of even one human being are held in con-
tempt the rights of all are in danger. We cannot destroy
the liberties of others without losing our own. By exciting
the prejudices of the ignorant we at last produce a con-
tempt for law and justice, and sow the seeds of violence and
crime... .After all, it pays to do right. This is a hard truth
to learn - especially for a nation. A great nation should be
bound by the highest conception of justice and honor.
Above all things it should be true to its treaties, its con-
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tracts, its obligations. It should remember that its respon-
sibilities are in accordance with its power and intelligence.1
- Colonel R.G. Ingersoll
I. INTRODUCTION
The ongoing debate over immigration reform in the United
States encompasses a plenitude of issues that would require their
own article to adequately list and explore. From this store of con-
troversial statements and counter-statements of principle, policy,
and law, I wish to address only the question of to what degree the
Fourteenth Amendment, from an interpretive perspective, binds
one to the (once) accepted proposition that, save for presently
irrelevant classes of individuals, children born on United States
soil are entitled to United States citizenship. This principle, once
itself a palliative to the racism of an earlier period, is being
increasingly targeted by immigration reformers because of its
apparent effect of rewarding the children of undocumented aliens
present in the U.S. at the time of birth. Given an ever expanding
class of undocumented aliens, this means that the ranks of U.S.
citizens will swell, with the accompanying extension of all the
rights and benefits that attend such status, but this swelling will
occur due to the actions of individuals not legally present in this
country. There is already an excellent body of literature, pro and
con, on the issue of whether the children of undocumented aliens
should be granted U.S. citizenship at birth, and I see no reason to
add to a corpus that seems, by my measure anyway, more or less
complete.2 My purpose concerns less the question of how law must
1. Col. R. G. Ingersoll, Should the Chinese Be Excluded?, 157 N. AM. REV. 52, 55,
58 (1893). Ingersoll's commentary is included with commentary by Representative
Geary of California, id. at 58-67, who had been the principal acting force behind the
Chinese registration law, the Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892), that extended by a
decade the operation of the Chinese Exclusion laws and which was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
2. See generally PETER SCHUCK & ROGERS SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT
90-116 (Yale University Press, 1985); Christine J. Hsieh, American Born Legal
Permanent Residents? A Constitutional Amendment Proposal, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
511 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT'L
L. 237 (1994); Natalie Smith, Developments in the Legislative Branch: Bill Challenges
Birthright Citizenship, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 325 (2006); Charles Wood, Losing
Control of America's Future - The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens,
22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465 (1999); Robert J. Shulman, Comment, Children of a
Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth Amendment Be Altered or Repealed to Deny
Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges to American Born Children of Illegal
Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 669 (1995); Note, The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A
Threat to Equality, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1026 (1994).
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be interpreted, framing that inquiry as the objective pursuit of
some "correct" answer to thejus soli dilemma, than how we should
interpret the legally operative provisions of our constitution in
light of our commitment to liberal democratic principles. Thus, I
wish to examine thejus soli issue from a doctrinal and philosophi-
cal point of view, while leaving the most controversial interpreta-
tive dilemmas at the threshold. I seek not to answer the question
how we may go about remedying a perceived ill in our system of
immigration and citizenship law, but rather the question of how
we should do so, if in fact any action can be countenanced by our
deeper and more fundamental political commitments.
This inquiry will be undertaken in a comparative perspective
to highlight those ideals that most caution against quick and over-
broad remedies that may, in the not too distant future, look like
total abrogations of our constitutional heritage. Part II of the pre-
sent article thus looks to two constitutional provisions that seem
to guarantee, from a purely semantic perspective, the same sort of
claim to citizenship by way ofjus soli: the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution, and Article 11 of the Constituci6n Polit-
ica de la Repdiblica Dominicana. Part III examines the definitive
interpretation given to the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of United
States v. Wong Kim Ark. Part IV presents the response of the
Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic to a law passed by the
national legislature defining the exact parameters of the classes of
individuals explicitly stated as ineligible forjus soli citizenship. A
contrast and comparison of these decisions is the content of Part
V, with the overarching purpose of determining to what extent our
political organs are bound by the established interpretation of our
constitution and what altering that interpretation might entail.
II. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF Jus SOLI: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
ARTICLE 11
There are no other amendments in the United States Consti-
tution so intractably bound to history as the Civil War Amend-
ments. The Thirteenth Amendment most directly addresses the
blight of the institution of slavery, rendering unconstitutional
both slavery and involuntary servitude,4 but it is the Citizenship
3. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that reverses the most
explicit pronouncement concerning the political effects of that
dehumanizing institution. That statement is, of course, Chief Jus-
tice Roger B. Taney's opinion for the Supreme Court in Dred Scott
v. Sandford,5 a decision second to none in the annals of despised
American jurisprudence.6 Without reciting the whole of the proce-
dural history behind the decision, it must only be stated that a
fundamental aspect of the case turned on whether Dred Scott, a
slave, was a citizen, thus allowing him standing to bring suit in a
court of the United States pursuant to jurisdiction granted by the
Constitution.7 The Chief Justice framed the issue thusly: "Can a
negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold
as slaves, become a member of the political community formed
and brought into existence by the Constitution of the United
States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privi-
leges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citi-
zen?"' What is at issue is the status of those persons who are
descendants of slaves, namely those that were born in the U.S. to
emancipated parents or to slaves who later became emancipated.9
The Court's conclusion:
We think they are not [citizens], and that they are not
included, and were not intended to be included, under the
words 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim
none of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.
On the contrary, they were at that time considered as a
subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been sub-
jugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or
not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no
rights or privileges[.]' °
Of course, before this language could be formally reversed by
amendment, a Civil War intervened.
In 1868, the decision was formally overturned by the amend-
ment process, and the Fourteenth Amendment, seeking to eradi-
5. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
6. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), comes closest, but inherent in the
separate-but-equal doctrine is a notion of equality - watered down past the point
where it makes sense to call it equality - yet nonetheless a significant step forward
from the stripping of all political and civil identity occasioned by the Dred Scott
decision.
7. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
8. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 404-05.
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cate a swath of ills, came into being. What is of importance here is
the first sentence of the first section of that amendment: "All per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside."1 This clause reestablished thejus soli
principle in United States law as a constitutionally protected
right. " Although present debate over whether to extend jus soli
citizenship to the children of undocumented aliens has rested, at
least in part, on an original understanding of this amendment,
there is substantial evidence tending to establish that the framers
understood the expansive grant of right they were embodying with
the language they chose. 3 And how expansive is this clause? It
applies to every child born to parents who are "subject to the juris-
diction" of the U.S., which means every child born in the U.S. save
for those born to foreign diplomats, foreign soldiers, and at least
as an original matter, Native Americans. These classes of individ-
uals are not subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.; diplomats
because of diplomatic immunity, foreign soldiers because of com-
batant immunity, and Native Americans because of separate sov-
ereignty issues." Yet how expansively must one interpret that
pivotal phrase, "subject to the jurisdiction thereof'? That is the
subject of the subsequent section dealing with Wong Kim Ark. For
now, one must only keep in mind the limited nature of the excep-
tions to the Fourteenth Amendment's jus soli principle that were
firmly established in 1868 and which a logical reading of its lan-
guage will uphold.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Reestablished, because, despite the Court's holding in Dred Scott and the lack
of explicit language in the constitution, jus soli had been generally accepted at
common law and in the infancy of the United States. See, e.g., Polly J. Price, Natural
Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin's Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 73
(1997); Jonathon C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution,
and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
667 (1995); see also Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99,
164 (1830) (Story, J.) ("Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine
that the children even of aliens born in a country, while the parents are resident there
under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto,
are subjects by birth.").
13. See James C. Ho, Defining "American": Birthright Citizenship and the
Original Understanding of the 14th Amendment, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 367 (2006).
14. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) (holding that Native Americans, born on
tribal land, did not have a right to citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment).
This fact was reversed in 1924 when Congress granted U.S. citizenship to Native
Americans in the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253. See also John
Rockwell Snowden, Wayne Tyndall & David Smith, American Indian Sovereignty and
Naturalization: It's A Race Thing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 171 (2001).
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The provision in the Dominican Republic's Constitution is
similar, though not identical, with its United States counterpart:
"Art.11. - Son dominicanos: 1. Todas las personas que nacieren en
el territorio de la Repiiblica, con excepci6n de los hijos legitimos de
los extranjeros residentes en el pais en representaci6n diplomdtica
o los que estan de transito en 0."" This paragraph is semantically
distinct from the Fourteenth Amendment, but its legal effect
seems to be virtually identical. Whereas the exception for the
children of diplomats was a background common law principle
read into the U.S. Constitution by the Supreme Court, Article 11
makes the exception explicit. The "foreigners in transit" exception
is broader than any other exception that has been read into the
U.S. Constitution, such as the exception for children born to par-
ents in an invading army, but the logical import of its language is
not such as would swallow a more general rule. Transit, by any
definition, implies a temporal and intentional limitation on a stay,
and so anybody within the Dominican Republic indefinitely would
not be able to claim jus soli citizenship for children born to them
during the duration of that stay.
Leaving behind the bare analysis of the language of these pro-
visions, it is worth taking stock here of how these provisions could
conceivably be applied to undocumented aliens in the respective
countries. In relation to the Fourteenth Amendment, there is not
explicit language limiting jus soli rules to lawfully present indi-
viduals; rather, the language extends to all people "subject to the
jurisdiction" of the United States. s As such, there seems to be no
reason, as a semantic, logical or legal matter, not to extendjus soli
citizenship to the children of undocumented aliens. In regards to
the Dominican Constitution, the answer remains the same bar-
ring one major caveat: the undocumented aliens must have an
intent to stay indefinitely. 7 This may seem like a small point to
make, but nonetheless, seasonal workers, such as migrants, would
not be eligible to take advantage of the Article 11, paragraph 1
grant of citizenship. Here it is clear that Article 11 is broader in
its restriction than the Fourteenth Amendment, but so long as the
aliens intend on staying in the country, then there is no inherent
15. Constituci6n Politica de la Repiiblica Dominicana de 2002, art. 11, para. 1
("Dominicans are: 1. All persons who have been born in the territory of the Republic,
except for the legitimate children of foreign diplomats resident in the country or
foreigners who are in transit.").
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See Constituci6n Politica de la Repfiblicana Dominicana 2002, art. 11, para. 1.
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limitation in this provision that would foreclose the extension of
the jus soli principle.
III. UNITED STATES V. WONG KIM Auc
SOLIDIFYING PRINCIPLE
The debate over the exact parameters of the Citizenship
Clause, raging since the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment,
finally came to a definitive jurisprudential head in 1898.1' With-
out exploring the history of immigration law during this period, it
is worth noting that immigration policy was concerned mainly
with one group: the Chinese. 9 Congress was given a virtual blank
check during this period to both exclude and deport aliens present
within the U.S. in language that made clear both of these acts
could be undertaken solely because of the alien's race.2 ° Although
18. See Bernadette Meyler, Article, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868-
1898 States' Rights, The Law of Nations, and Mutual Consent, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
519 (2001).
19. For an assortment of different accounts of this era, as well as its ramifications
for future U.S. immigration law and policy, see generally Kitty Calavita, Collisions at
the Intersection of Gender, Race, and Class: Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Laws, 40
LAw & Soc'Y REV. 249 (2006); Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity,
and "Passing" Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910, 25 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 1 (2000); Henry S. Cohn & Harvey Gee, "NO, NO, NO, NO!": Three Sons of
Connecticut Who Opposed the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2003);
Richard P. Cole & Gabriel J. Chin, Emerging From the Margins of Historical
Consciousness: Chinese Immigrants and the History of American Law, 17 LAw & HIST.
REV. 325 (1999); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A
Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853 (1987); Thomas
Wuil Joo, New "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment: Nineteenth Century
Chinese Civil Rights Cases and the Development of Substantive Due Process
Jurisprudence, 29 U.S.F.L. REV. 353 (1995); Earl M. Maltz, The Federal Government
and the Problem of Chinese Rights in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 223 (1994); Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil
Rights in Nineteenth Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CAL. L. REV.
529 (1984); John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese
Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 AsIAN L.J. 55 (1996); Emily Ryo, Article,
Through the Back Door: Applying Theories of Legal Compliance to Illegal Immigration
During the Chinese Exclusion Era, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 109 (2006); Natsu Taylor
Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The "Plenary Power"
Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13 (2003); Jan C.
Ting, "Other Than a Chinaman": How U.S. Immigration Law Resulted From and Still
Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Asian Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ.
RTS. L. REV. 301 (1995); Ming-sung Kuo, Article, The Duality of Federalist Nation-
Building: Two Strains of Chinese Immigration Cases Revisited, 67 ALB. L. REV. 27
(2003).
20. On excludability see Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion
Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (implicitly upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act byway of
finding an implicit and sole Congressional power to regulate immigration that
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not every decision before 1898 relating to the Chinese was a total
loss,21 even when they were victorious before the high court, the
opinions were consumed with prejudice.
Amidst this backdrop of racial animus, Wong Kim Ark was
born in San Francisco, California in 1873.22 Ark's parents were of
Chinese descent and were not themselves U.S. citizens, but rather
citizens of China. In 1890, he and his parents left California for
China on a temporary visit. Upon his return, he was permitted
entry to the U.S. on the ground that he was a native born citizen.
In 1894 Wong Kim Ark again departed for China, but returned to
the U.S. in August 1895. At that point, he was denied entry on
the ground that he was not a U.S. citizen. The importance of this
distinction lay with the application of the Chinese Exclusion Acts
that, if he were a U.S. citizen, would not apply to him. The ques-
tion, as phrased by Justice Gray for the 6-2 majority,23 was
"whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese
descent, who at the time of his birth are subjects of the emperor of
China.. .becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United
States, by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution[.] "24 Yet, because the Constitution does not
define the term "citizen," to inform the court relating to the Citi-
zenship Clause, an examination of the common law must be
undertaken.25
At common law, the fundamental principle relating to English
nationality was that ofjus soli; children born in England, includ-
ing to friendly aliens, would be deemed natural-born subjects.26
The only exceptions to this principle were children born to foreign
included the power to exclude aliens solely because of their race). On deportability
see Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding a law requiring
Chinese aliens to register with the federal government, with the failure to do so
resulting in deportation).
21. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (striking down a law
imposing one year of hard labor on Chinese aliens found to be present illegally in the
U.S. prior to deporting them, in the absence of a trial); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886) (finding Chinese aliens present in the U.S. entitled to the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, in the process of striking down
a local ordinance neutral on its face but discriminatorily applied).
22. The facts stated herein are taken from Justice Gray's recitation in United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 469, 652-53 (1898).
23. Justice Joseph McKenna, though an Associate Justice by the time the case was
decided, had not been confirmed as a member of the Court when the case was argued,
and thus took no part in the decision. See id. at 705.
24. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653.
25. Id. at 654.
26. Id. at 655.
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diplomats and those born to alien enemies 7.2  The validity of this
principle in England prior to the American Revolution was
attested to by an examination of case law, including the famous
exposition of jus soli in Calvin's Case.2' This principle was also,
from the beginning and through the present, operative in the
United States.29 A broader examination of international law led
Justice Gray to the conclusion that at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, there was no general and well-accepted
rule inconsistent with that of the jus soli principle. 0 Regardless,
it is the "inherent right of every independent nation to determine
for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what
classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship."31 Thus, the
true question is, 'what does the citizenship clause of the U.S. con-
stitution mean,' not 'what are other countries doing?'
The outcome of this analysis is betrayed by Justice Gray's
first sentence in Part V of his opinion: "the fundamental principle
of citizenship by birth within the dominion was reaffirmed in the
most explicit and comprehensive terms" by the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 The phraseology, not universal but surely general,
is meant to limit the extension of citizenship solely because of ter-
ritorial or jurisdictional limitations, not because of race or color.3
This interpretation is bolstered by the opinions of the Court in the
Slaughter House Cases34 and Elk v. Wilkins35 , the only prior cases
that by necessity had to address the meaning of the Citizenship
Clause. "All persons born" means all persons born, except to the
extent that limitations arise from the qualification of "and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof." Yet all this qualification does is reest-
ablish the common law understanding of jus soli, excluding the
children born to foreign diplomats and enemy aliens from the
operation of the principle36, a fact the Supreme Court has long rec-
ognized.37 Thus, the totality of the foregoing considerations and
27. Id.
28. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655-58 (1898); see also Price,
supra note 12.
29. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 658-66.
30. Id. at 667.
31. Id. at 668.
32. Id. at 675.
33. Id. at 676.
34. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 676-80 (1898) (citing
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
35. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 680-82 (citing Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S.94
(1884)).
36. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 682.
37. See generally United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819) (discussing
20071
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authorities leads to the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, by its clear terms, establishes the U.S. citizenship of every
child born within its jurisdiction, no matter the race or color, so
long as they do not fall within one of the recognized exceptions to
jus soli.'8
This is all well and good in principle, but what of the Chinese
themselves, whom Congress has seen fit to single out for restric-
tions on entry? Absent a constitutional provision limiting the
powers of Congress or the Executive, they have broad powers to
limit or exclude any type of person they wish. Yet, just as this is
the case, it is equally true that it is the province of the Judiciary to
give full effect to any constitutional provision that does speak
directly to an issue - as the Fourteenth Amendment does in this
case.39 The Court had already held that Chinese aliens, resident
in the United States, despite their continued status as subjects of
the Chinese emperor, were "persons" within the meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4" Having
previously held these aliens to be within the jurisdiction of the
state of California, it would be contradictory to not also deem
them within the jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of
the Citizenship Clause.4 ' In fact, although the present case repre-
sented the first time the issue was squarely presented before the
court, (i.e., whether the child of Chinese aliens born within the
U.S. was a citizen), the Court had previously assumed that would
be the legal effect of such an occurrence, although it had found
proof of such a birth lacking. 2 In short, no matter how extensive
congressional and executive power is in the fields of exclusion,
deportation, and naturalization, jus soli operates independently
and solely by the fact of birth within the jurisdiction of the coun-
try. As such, the fact
that acts of congress or treaties have not permitted Chinese
persons born out of this country to become citizens by natu-
ralization, cannot exclude Chinese persons born in this
country from the operation of the broad and clear words of
the Constitution: 'All persons born in the United States,
the application of U.S. jurisdiction to enemy aliens); Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (discussing the application of U.S. law to foreign parties
and their exemption from U.S. jurisdiction).
38. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693.
39. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693.
40. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
41. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 696 (1898).
42. See Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891).
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and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States.'43
Wong Kim Ark was born on United States soil, is certainly
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, and has done nothing to forfeit
the grant of citizenship he became endowed with by the operation
of these foregoing facts. He was, thus, a citizen of the United
States, and could not be denied entrance pursuant to the Chinese
Exclusion Acts.
Chief Justice Melville Fuller, joined by Justice John Marshall
Harlan, dissented." Although there is language at the beginning
of the dissent tending to rest the opinion on support of jus
sanguinis citizenship rather than jus soli, especially in light of
what the majority's reasoning allegedly perpetrates on the chil-
dren born to U.S. citizens who are abroad at the time of birth, the
dissent is, in fact, far more radical than that.45 It represents not
only the advocacy of a different principle to govern citizenship, but
an abrogation of the legal hierarchy that had governed since Mar-
bury v. Madison and a return to a plenary power of Congress in
regards to naturalization and citizenship that would, if it was the
desire of that body, return the country to the principle of Dred
Scott.46 This might seem like a harsh assessment, but the lan-
guage of the dissent, most clearly the closing two pages, support
it. 47
First, based on an assessment of treaty law between the U.S.
and China, and of Chinese and U.S. law on naturalization, the
Chief Justice states that, in his opinion and taking into account all
of these sources, "the children of Chinese born in this country do
not, ipso facto, become citizens of the United States unless the
fourteenth amendment overrides both treaty and statute. 4 s One
43. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 704.
44. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 705-732 (Fuller, C.J. & Harlan, J., dissenting).
For an interesting article on Justice Harlan's voting in the Chinese cases as compared
with the reputation garnered by his lone dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, see Gabriel J.
Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Case, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151
(1996).
45. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 705-732 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Fuller also
makes much of the notion of "allegiance" and how a child born here, if granted
citizenship, would have divided allegiances. This is, of course, a confusion of terms,
using as synonyms allegiance and citizen, although there is no necessary relationship
past the purely semantic or formal.
46. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
47. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) at 731-732 (Fuller,
C.J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 732.
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would have thought the question of the constitutional hierarchy
had been put to rest by the former Chief Justice, John Marshall.49
Nonetheless, and in pursuit of a return to the pre-Civil War Dred
Scott understanding of citizenship, Fuller goes even further: "is it
not the proper construction that all persons born in the United
States or parents permanently residing here, and susceptible of
becoming citizens, and not prevented therefrom by treaty or statute,
are citizens, and not otherwise?" 50 This is a quite convenient
interpretation, because the Chinese were the only ones not suscep-
tible of becoming citizens by way of naturalization. Far from
being a better "interpretation" from any objective point of view,
this language is clearly a subjective manifestation of prejudice,
masquerading in the garb of impartial adjudication. The interpre-
tation no doubt furthers the animus of the day, but Fuller wishes
to go even further-to read the Citizenship Clause entirely out of
the Fourteenth Amendment: "I am of opinion that the president
and senate by treaty, and the congress by legislation, have the
power, notwithstanding the fourteenth amendment, to prescribe
that all persons of a particular race, or their children, cannot
become citizens," with the corollary that those so allowed to enter
cannot bestow citizenship upon their children simply by the fate
49. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-78.
"The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is
written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose
is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any
time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction
between a government with limited and unlimited powers is
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they
are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal
obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the
constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the
legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act. Between
these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is
either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like
other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act
contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true,
then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the
people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. Certainly all
those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an
act of the legislature repugnant to the constitution is void." Id.
Fuller would fall on the opposite side of Marshall's disjunction.
50. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 731 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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that their children were born in the U.S.51
In Fuller's interpretation of the Citizenship Clause, then,
there is an odd reversal of interpretation. The language of the
fourteenth amendment itself has absolutely no bearing on citizen-
ship. The question for Fuller and Harlan is not whether this child
was born in the U.S. or subject to the jurisdiction thereof (a test
that would seem to be the sole one pursuant to the Constitution),
but whether his or her parents have the ability, under U.S. or for-
eign law, statutory or treaty-based, to become citizens of the U.S.
themselves! A clause that, by any logical reading, is focused on
the child is meant to depend entirely on the status of the parents.
Thus Fuller's exposition of the Citizenship Clause goes:
the fourteenth amendment does not exclude from citizen-
ship by birth children born in the [U.S.] of parents perma-
nently located therein, and who might themselves become
citizens; nor ... does it arbitrarily make citizens of children
born in the [U.S.] of parents who, according to the will of
their native government and of this government, are and
must remain aliens.5 2
And, as Wong Kim Ark is a child of Chinese parents, who them-
selves cannot be naturalized because of U.S. law, Ark himself is
not a citizen and can be legally denied admission to the United
States.
Whatever one's view of the majority's reading of the Amend-
ment, expansive as it undoubtedly is, the dissent is anything but
persuasive. If there is a way to limit the reach of the Citizenship
Clause, that objective should not be attained by ignoring the clear
language of the Amendment and making the operation of the prin-
ciple depend on an exterior criterion that has never been legally
embraced. The conflation of allegiance and citizenship (while still
confused and unpersuasive), is closer to a legitimate jurispruden-
tial limitation to the apparentjus soli principle in the clause than
the interpretation that leads directly to the only result counte-
nanced by Congress and the Executive in enacting exclusion laws
targeting the Chinese. The principle Fuller states could be broad,
but there is no doubt who it was meant to apply to. Fuller, with a
majority, would have succeeded in perpetrating a kind of Dred
Scott II, relegating an entire race to a hinterland somewhere
outside the potential bounds of U.S. citizenship. Although that
51. Id. at 731-32 (emphasis added).
52. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 732 (1898).
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interpretation did not carry the day a century ago, there is no rea-
son to think we are permanently out of those woods.
The parameters of thejus soli principle, as stated by the court
in Wong Kim Ark, have never been seriously questioned by the
Supreme Court, and have been accepted as dogma by lower courts.
Typical of this acceptance is the Ninth Circuit's statement that
"United States nationality depends primarily upon the place of
birth, the common law principle of jus soli having been embodied
in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution[.] 53 The
Supreme Court cases since 1898 dealing with citizenship have
focused predominantly on questions relating to what extent and in
what manner Congress may regulate citizenship outside the prin-
ciples stated in the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.54 This is not to say the jus soli principle that now prevails
in U.S. immigration law is concrete. Rather, like any constitu-
tional interpretation, it retains a certain fluidity, at least poten-
tially. Nonetheless, at least now in 2008, the same interpretation
prevails and there is little reason to think that the Supreme Court
will reverse itself on this point, especially considering more recent
decisions explicitly addressing undocumented aliens within the
U.S. polity."
53. Cabebe v. Acheson, 183 F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1950).
54. See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding the
constitutionality of section 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409, which creates a statutory distinction concerning the conferral of citizenship on
children born out of wedlock depending on whether the individual seeking such
conferral is the father or mother); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998) (same);
Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971) (upholding a provision of the INA that required a
foreign-born U.S. citizen to reside in the U.S. for at least five years prior to their 28th
birthday in order to retain that citizenship); Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657 (1927)
(upholding a statute prohibiting a child born outside the U.S. from claiming U.S.
citizenship through a U.S. citizen parent who had not lived in the U.S. prior to the
child's birth).
55. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that a Texas statute directing
the withholding of state funds from school districts for the education of children
illegally present in the United States was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); but see Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535
U.S. 137 (2002) (holding that a company could withhold back pay from an
undocumented alien worker who was illegally fired, even though such back pay would
be a normal part of the remedy for the time the individual was not working).
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IV. SENTENCIA QuE DECLARA CONSTITUCIONAL LA LEY
GENERAL DE MIGRACION 285-04: STATUTORY
ABROGATION OF CONSTITUTIONALLY
GUARANTEED RIGHTS
The opinion of the Dominican Republic's Supreme Court of
Justice in Sentencia Que Declara Constitucional la Ley General de
Migraci6n 285-04"6 reads like an adoption of the principles set out
in Chief Justice Fuller's dissent in Wong Kim Ark. And, unfortu-
nately for that nation, a similar disdain and prejudice for a certain
class of aliens, in this case Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian
descent, went a long way in structuring the Court's opinion. Social
mores and opinions undoubtedly operated on the U.S. Supreme
Court during this period as well, but in two key cases, Yick Wo
and Wong Kim Ark, the Court was able to look past the class of
individuals at issue and read the Constitution for what it was and
is: a document that "neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. " " Justice Gray states unequivocally for the Court the
fundamental justification for judicial review: that even though
Congress and the Executive have broad and extensive powers, the
Constitution itself will operate as the check, limit, and touchstone
of those powers, and no statute or treaty can operate to divest the
Court of its power to gauge legislative or executive action by the
measuring stick of that document. 8 Congress and the President
have broad powers indeed, but not infinite power. This is a lesson
forgotten by the Dominican court, which happily ceded its juris-
prudential mission to the legislature in the face of a controversy it
was simply not up to confronting directly. Before addressing this
decision itself, however, a slight glance at the history and current
events that informed it should be examined. Context is both eve-
rything and nothing in the law; while it informs our decision mak-
56. Daniel Valcarcel, Suprema Corte De Justicia: Sentencia de Pleno del 15 de
Diciembre de 2005, 12 FORO CONSTITUCIONAL IBEROAMERICANO 1279-1288
(2005-2006) (Dominican Republic) (unpublished comment), available at http://
www.uc3m.es/uc3m/inst/MGP/FC112SRD1.pdf.
57. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). I am
aware of the irony of using this quote, and perhaps do it solely for that reason.
Harlan does mention the Chinese in his opinion, but seemingly only to note the true
horrific extent of the Louisiana law, i.e., as if to say even the Chinese can ride in the
same car as whites, so how could you exclude blacks? See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (finding Chinese aliens present in the U.S. entitled to the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
granted citizenship to persons of Chinese descent born in the United States).
58. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 694-704.
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ing ultimately we must understand that the provisions of the
Constitution it helps us interpret are principled and increasingly
acontextual.
Tension on the island of Hispaniola (on which the Dominican
Republic occupies the eastern-most two-thirds and Haiti the west-
ern remainder), has existed since at least 1801 when, because of
the spillover effect of the Haitian revolution onto the Dominican
side, the Dominican Republic came under Haitian rule. 9 As a
result of this extensive history, "this tension has become
entrenched in all corners of Dominican society and manifests itself
as xenophobia with overtones of racism."" This fact is exacer-
bated by the dramatic flow of illegal immigration of Haitians into
the Dominican Republic, making an exact estimate of how many
Haitians are currently living in the D.R. a matter of politically
motivated manipulation.6 A logical response to such trends is to
legislate on immigration matters, but there are good and bad ways
to go about this. Migration Law 285-04, which, through a defini-
tional reworking of the constitutional exceptions for the granting
of jus soli citizenship, excludes the children of illegal immigrants
from the purview of Article 11, paragraph 1,62 is representative of
the latter, rather than the former.
As Baluarte writes, this law, passed in August of 2004, "is an
illustration of the general trend in the Dominican Republic to leg-
islate anti-Haitian sentiments."63 Further, illustrations of govern-
mental support for institutionalized racism occurred subsequent
to a wave of violence set off in the wake of a May 2005 murder of a
Dominican woman.' The D.R.'s Secretary of Labor "announced a
plan to 'dehaitianize' the country," while the Public Ministry
openly justified vigilante attacks against Haitians.65 More osten-
sibly, legal action was taken as well, with massive expulsions and
59. See David C. Baluarte, Inter-American Justice Comes to the Dominican
Republic: An Island Shakes as Human Rights and Sovereignty Clash, 13 NO. 2 Hum.
Rrs. BRIEF 25, (2006); see generally, LAURENT DUBOIS, AVENGERS OF THE NEW WORLD,
THE STORY OF THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press)
(2004).
60. Baluarte, supra note 59, at 25.
61. Estimates range from the 4,205 Haitians that government official records
show, through the 300,000 that non-governmental organizations that work with
Haitian communities estimate, up until the number 1 million, which is the figure
many Dominican nationalist groups have floated in the debate. Id.
62. See Constituci6n Politica de la Rep-iblica Dominicana de 2002, art. 11, para. 1;
see also Valcarcel, supra note 56.
63. Baluarte, supra note 59, at 25.
64. See id. at 25-26.
65. Id.
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deportations of Haitians, including one weekend where over 2,000
were forcibly and violently deported.6 ' Against this backdrop, the
Dominican Republic also legislated a number of cumbersome pro-
cedures whereby parents could validate the birth of their child as
one encompassed by the constitutional prescription ofjus soli. In
1997, two girls attempted to attain birth certificates stating that
they were Dominican, and offered proof that they had been born in
the Dominican Republic and their mothers were Dominican.67
Nonetheless, the civil registry refused to issue the birth certifi-
cates, as "[a]n 11-point proof of nationality test that carried pro-
hibitively onerous requirements for documentation led to the
denial of the girls' Dominican nationality."' And it is here that
our story, from a jurisprudential point of view, begins. With the
help of the Center for Justice and International Law and the
International Human Rights Law Clinic at the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, these two girls were able to present their case
first to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and,
because of failures in the friendly settlement process, ultimately
to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which rendered a
decision in the girls' case in September 2005.9
The case came to the Court on the allegation of the Commis-
sion that the Dominican Republic had refused to issue birth certif-
icates to the girls, despite the fact that they were born on
Dominican soil and the Dominican Constitution establishes the
jus soli principle of citizenship. 7° At issue, for purposes of inter-
preting this domestic article, was Article 20 of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights:
71
Article 20. Right to Nationality
1. Every person has the right to a nationality.
2. Every person has the right to the nationality of the
state in whose territory he was born if he does not have
the right to any other nationality.
3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
or of the right to change it.
72
66. Id. at 26.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id at 26-27.
70. Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Case 130, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
§ I., para. 3 (Sept. 8, 2005) (hereinafter Jean and Bosico).
71. See id.
72. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 20, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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One of the key points at issue was an interpretation of the Consti-
tution, later embodied in the 2004 Migration Law, that fit all
undocumented aliens into the "in transit" exception, no matter
their actual residence status in the Dominican Republic. The
arguments made by the Commission and the representatives of
the girls were, in effect, first that no restriction of thejus soli prin-
ciple was allowed based solely on the nationality or alienage of the
parents, so long as the child was born on Dominican soil, and sec-
ond, it is unacceptable to describe aliens present in the Dominican
for extended periods of time as "in transit" for purposes of exclud-
ing them from the operation of Article 11, paragraph L" The
Dominican Republic countered these assertions by arguing that
the denial of birth certificates was not for discriminatory reasons,
but rather because the girls had not complied with the require-
ments that were implemented to assure they had been born in the
country. 4 Furthermore, the status of the girl's parents was not at
issue since the Constitution does guarantee jus soli citizenship,
which the girls were granted, and which they always had a right
to apply for, so long as they followed the requisite steps and
requirements in doing so.
75
The Court first noted the importance of nationality within
international law, as well as its role as a mediating principle
between the subject individual and the state. 6 Although the right
to determine who is a national of a State is within the purview of a
nation's sovereign authority, it is not a determination without lim-
itations.77 Rather, this domestic authority of the State is "limited,
on the one hand, by their obligation to provide individuals with
the equal and effective protection of the law and, on the other
hand, by their obligation to prevent, avoid and reduce stateless-
ness."78 Under domestic law in the Dominican Republic, both con-
stitutional and statutory, the jus soli principle is extended to all
children born on Dominican soil, save the children of diplomats
and those "foreigners in transit."79 The specific allegation of the
commission and the children's representatives was that "the State
authorities had taken the position, and made it effective in prac-
73. See id. at § I, para. 111(a)-(b), para. 116(a)-(b).
74. See id. at § I., para. 121(a)-(b).
75. See Jean and Bosico, Case 130, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) § I., para. 121(a)-(b)
(Sept. 8, 2005).
76. See id. at § I., para. 136-139.
77. Id. at § I., para., 140.
78. Id.
79. Id. at § I., para. 148-150.
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tice, that children of Haitian origin born in the Dominican Repub-
lic... would not be Dominican nationals, because their fathers are
Haitian migratory workers and are considered to be in transit.""0
Yet, quoting from the Inter-American Commission's 1999 Report
on the Situation of Human Rights in the Dominican Republic, the
Court noted the unrealistic nature of this interpretation:
Around 500,000 undocumented Haitian workers live in the
Dominican Republic. In many cases, these are people who
have lived there for 20 or 40 years and many of them have
been born on Dominican territory. Most of them face a situ-
ation of permanent illegality, which they transmit to their
children, who cannot obtain Dominican nationality
because, according to the restrictive interpretation that
Dominican Authorities give to article 11 of the Constitu-
tion, they are children of "foreigners in transit." It is not
possible to consider that people are in transit when they
have lived for many years in a country where they have
developed innumerable connections of all kinds."1
The Court bolstered the logic of the Commission's observation
with language from the decision of a national appeals court in the
Dominican Republic that had heard the girl's claims in relation to
the denial of birth certificates:
It is not possible to equate the situation of a foreigner's ille-
gality to the notion of transit, because they are different
concepts .... [Nowhere in]... the regulations for the appli-
cation of the Migration Law... is the condition of legality
established as a requirement for having the right to the
nationality of the place of birth .... A]lthough it is true
that the parents of the child live in the country illegally, it
is no less true that this situation of illegality cannot in any
way affect the children, who can benefit from Dominican
nationality merely by proving that they were born on
Dominican territory, and that their parents are not diplo-
mats in the country and are not in transit[.]X
2
The Court also directed attention to Dominican law in force when
80. Id. at § I., para. 152.
81. Jean and Bosico, Case 130, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) § I., para. 153 (Sept. 8,
2005) (quoting Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Dominican Republic,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.104, doc.49, rev.1, (Oct. 7, 1999), para. 363).
82. Id. at § I., para. 154 (quoting Judgment No. 453 of the Civil Chamber of the
Court of Appeal of the National District issued on October 16, 2003) (file of
preliminary objections and possible merits, reparations and costs, tome II, folios 586
to 612).
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the children were denied birth certificates, and which would be
altered by the 2004 law, which described "in transit" as taking no
more than ten days to pass through the country." Regardless of
how "in transit" is defined, "the State must respect a reasonable
temporal limit and understand that a foreigner who develops con-
nections in a State cannot be equated to a person in transit."
4
Whatever the limit may be, the children in this case, having been
born on Dominican soil to Dominican mothers, are undoubtedly
deserving of Dominican nationality under the relevant laws and
constitutional provisions. The broader rule, however, is what is
important: the state must reasonably interpret its own constitu-
tion, and cannot interpret it in such a way as to discriminatorily
deny rights to entire classes of people.
The reaction of Dominican society to the Court's decision was
predictable, yet disheartening. The "Dominican Ministry of For-
eign Affairs released a statement calling the Court's decision
'unacceptable"' on October 11, 2005.85 Although the Dominican
ambassador to the Organization of American States advocated
complete compliance with the decision, all branches of the domes-
tic government reacted with hostility.86 The vice president denied
the validity of the Court's decision, while the Dominican Senate
issued a resolution rejecting the Court's ruling a week after the
foreign ministry's response. 7 This same body is stirring up anti-
Haitian sentiment while advocating for a constitutional amend-
ment that would establish jus sanguine citizenship principles as
the only way to grant citizenship (outside naturalization), so as to
deny Dominican citizenship to all children born of Haitians on
Dominican soil.8 As Baluarte notes, this is in itself a permissible
regime embraced by many nations across the world, yet its adop-
tion in the wake of the Court's decision "reaches beyond bad faith
and reaffirms the existence of institutionalized discrimination[.]8 9
Amidst this dissent in the democratic branches of the Dominican
government, a case was brought by a number of non-governmental
organizations, in the Dominican court system, challenging the
83. See id. at § I., para. 157 (citing Section V of the Rules of Procedure of
Migration No. 279 of May 12, 1939).
84. Id. at § I., para. 157.
85. Baluarte, supra note 59, at 28 (citing Secretaria de Estado de Relaciones
Exteriores, "Declaraci6n en torno a una Sentencia de la Corte Interamericana de
Derechos Humanos," Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic (Oct. 11, 2005)).





Migration Law of 2004, specifically the provision that sought to
deny jus soli citizenship to the children of illegal immigrants.
Thus, we finally arrive at the legally sanctioned embodiment of
Fuller's dissent, a century late and in a different nation.
As in the case before the Inter-American Commission and
Court, the challenge to the Dominican Republic's domestic law, in
its domestic courts, came from non-governmental organizations
concerned with human rights, immigration law, and Haitian cul-
ture.90 These organizations sought a declaration that certain pro-
visions of the 2004 Migration Law were unconstitutional9 and
alleged that they represented discrimination against Haitians
present in the Dominican Republic.92 Most on point, for purposes
of this article, is Article 36 of the Migration Law, which, in part,
sought to define "foreigners in transit" as the government had pre-
viously interpreted that provision administratively, i.e., all
undocumented aliens in the country, no matter duration of pres-
ence, would be deemed "in transit."93
First, the Court noted that the legislature is a coordinate
branch of government, entitled to interpret the Constitution just
as the Court, and that the Migration Law arose from the Congress
acting as an interpreter of Article 11." A reading of the Constitu-
tion, together with other provisions of Dominican immigration
law, leads to the conclusion that there are certain inherent limita-
tions on who can become a Dominican national, and that, far from
being a right, Dominican nationality is a privilege that can be
extended only under the circumstances contemplated by the Con-
stitution and established law.9" Yet Article 11 itself represents a
gap of sorts, for the language "foreigners in transit" is not defined
within the Constitution. The Dominican Congress, having broad
90. See the list of representative organizations at Valcarcel, supra note 56, at
1279-80.
91. Id. at 1280.
92. Id. at 1281. The Court also addressed the alleged discriminatory aspects of
Article 28 of the law, which drew a distinction between males and females in relation
to what had to be shown for their children to be deemed Dominican nationals. See id.
at 1282-88.
93. Id. at 1284.
94. Valcarcel, supra note 56, at 1285 ("Considerando, que el hecho de ser la
Constituci6n la norma suprema de un Estado no la hace insusceptible de
interpretaci6n, como aducen los impetrantes, admiti6ndose modernamente, por el
contrario, no solo la interpretaci6n de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia sino la que se
hace por via de la llamada interpretaci6n legislative, que es aquella en que el
Congreso sanciona una nueva ley para fijar el verdadero sentido y alcance de otra, que
es lo que en parte ha hecho la Ley General de Migraci6n ndim. 285-04[.]").
95. Id.
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powers to legislate in any event, certainly has the ability and
authority to define the undefined term in the Constitution.9 6 So
long as this interpretation does not offend any fundamental prin-
ciples inherent in the Dominican political order and the law which
embodies it complies with the constitutional requirements of
legality, it must be given effect as a valid and legitimate exercise
of Congressional authority, i.e., as a constitutionally permissive
law.97 There is no indication here that the law does not comply
with the constitutionally required mode of passage, nor does it
conflict with any more fundamental domestic or international
obligations. In regards to statelessness, the Dominican law does
not operate to deprive Haitian descendants born on Dominican
soil of any nationality, as, by Haitian constitutional law these chil-
dren will be deemed to be citizens of Haiti by operation of the jus
sanguinis principle.98 All these various points being taken into
account, the Dominican court found that the Migration Law,
including Article 36 purporting to define "in transit," was
constitutional.
The perceived illegitimacy of this decision does not necessa-
rily arise from the structure of the Dominican polity the Court
establishes. In our system as well, Congress must be deemed to
be a coordinate branch in relation to constitutional interpretation,
meaning only that a statute is presumed to be at least roughly in
line with the ideals and principles of that document. Moreover,
the Court's task in the U.S. is not to substitute its opinion or
determine that perhaps another course of action should have been
taken, but rather only to judge the law consistent or inconsistent
with the Constitution. It is the strict application of these notions
to this case that stretches the limits of constitutional legitimacy.
The Dominican Court signs off on, in a very cursory fashion, a
decision by the Congress that demanded, at the least, a more in
depth look at intent and application, especially considering many
of the public statements made by officials during the pendency of
the Inter-American Case and its aftermath. Maybe because the
Migration Law embodied their own prejudices, or perhaps because
96. Id. at 1285-86.
97. Id. at 1286 ("Considerando, que por esas razones, las dichas disposiciones de la
ley atacada no podrian verse en si mismas, en tanto fueron dictadas en armonia con la
regal del articulo 37 numeral 9 de la Constituci6n, como violatorias de los principios
fundmentales vinculados con la nacionalidad ni de ningdn otro principio fundamental
o ninguna regal que sustituya la competencia del legislador en virtud del antes citado
articulo 37 numeral 9 de la Constituci6n[.]").
98. Id.
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they did not wish to buck the clear public opinion, the Court, effec-
tively surrenders its mandate to interpret the Constitution to the
Congress, which is then free to move from a policy of discrimina-
tion to the clear institution of prejudice. It is as if our Supreme
Court had noted a law that had been subject to bicameralism and
presentment and thus must be constitutional; a scary constitu-
tional apathy, indeed! Despite lip-service to notions of non-dis-
crimination based upon such classifications as national origin, the
Court never addresses the legitimate, and probably correct, con-
tention that the law was premised on nothing but animus and
prejudice to a certain class of nationals currently residing in the
Dominican Republic. To ask these deeper questions would make
it more and more difficult to find the law constitutional, and thus
the decision represents nothing but a political judgment, passing
the buck, so to speak. Its superficiality is manifest with the turn
of every word.
V. OF CITIZENSHIP, UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS, AND
POLITICAL MORALITY
Circumstantial similarities between these cases and the pre-
sent situation the United States finds itself in are readily appar-
ent. In late nineteenth century America, we were concerned with
the influx of Chinese immigrants, whereas today we are concerned
predominantly with Mexican immigration. The Dominicans wish
to curb the effects of Haitian migration. The racial overtones have
been played down for the most part, under the guise of ostensibly
neutral laws of general applicability, but who, understanding the
history and context of the 2004 Dominican law would question
who it was meant to effect? The number of non-Haitian migrant
workers must be miniscule, though I do not know the number.
The governmental rhetoric and passivity in the face of violence
against Haitians in any event dispels the myth that the law was
meant to do anything but bar one class of people from becoming
citizens of the Dominican Republic. More than a century ago we
Americans wore our animus and prejudice on our sleeves. There
was no doubt the driving force behind the immigration policy
relating to the Chinese: to bar them, and if not, make it as onerous
as possible for them to remain. We have more tact now, taking
the path of the Dominicans in terms of legal proposals while hold-
ing our tongues from rhetoric. We support laws of general appli-
cability - ban jus soli! - but this neutrality is a guise covering the
only class of individuals we wish to effect with our new laws. In
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all three of these cases laws were passed, or will be passed, in
response to a single stimuli, inflamed and spread by a vociferous
public and political debate and informed not slightly by prejudice
or animus.
As Ingersoll wrote in 1893 in relation to the Chinese, "[i]n our
country, [the United States,] as a matter of fact, there is but little
prejudice against emigrants coming from Europe... but nearly all
* . . are united in their prejudice against the Chinese. "99 Today, it
is Mexicans who represent a supposed scourge on our culture,
identity, and way of life. Instead of immediate integration there is
an increasing lag between the assimilation of Mexican immigrants
in succeeding generations and those of other national groups.
00
There is also a growing trend towards bilingualism in schools,
places of employment, and signs that undoubtedly make nativists
uncomfortable with the encroachment. 01 Mexican culture is more
apparent everywhere you look, and what can this be if not a
threat?0 2 Of course, it has been claimed for years that the sky is
falling in all manner of ways and due to all manner of causes, yet
it is still above us. These issues are not to be discussed here in
any event, for if there is a legal requirement that citizenship must
be extended no matter our feelings about who it is being extended
to, then that requirement exists independently of any animus or
prejudice directed at that class. It is to the examination of poten-
tial constitutional interpretation and political morality, that I
turn to in the following pages. Yet, before doing so, I must first
justify the legitimacy of the endeavor itself.
In sitting down to write this article, having already decided
for myself that citizenship is an important aspect of membership
in the U.S. political community that should be extended to all
those who qualify by either constitutional or legislative provision,
I have operated on an assumption that is not universally held. In
99. Ingersoll, supra note 1, at 53.
100. See generally S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Hans P. Johnson, Second-
Generation Immigrants in California, CALIFORNIA COUNTS, May 2005.
101. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Chong, Book Review, Broadening Support for Bilingual
Education, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 163 (2005); Richard Fry & B. Lindsay Lowell,
The Value of Bilingualism in the U.S. Labor Market, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
128 (2003); Ren6 Galindo & Jami Vigil, Language Restrictionism Revisited: The Case
Against Colorado's 2000 Anti-Bilingual Education Initiative, 7 HARV. LATINO L.
REV. 27 (2004); Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100
NW. U.L. REV. 1689 (2006).
102. "Latin" culture would make for a better statement, but the nuance between
different Latin cultures is lost on many Americans, and so the resentment is directed
at a more readily apparent adversary - in this case, Mexicans.
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fact, Alexander Bickel held the opposing point of view that citizen-
ship has no transcendent place in our constitutional scheme and
was only iterated and forgotten due to accidents of legal history.
At an address given at the University of Arizona College of Law in
February 1973, Bickel first laid out the framework of the thesis
that would later be incorporated in the posthumously published
The Morality of Consent:..3 that "the concept of citizenship plays
only the most minimal role in the American constitutional
scheme.""4 The framers of the Constitution did not ignore the con-
cept of citizenship, making a few federal offices dependent upon
citizenship, 15 granting Congress the power to make a uniform rule
of naturalization, 6 and operating under the assumption that
birth, as well as such naturalization procedures Congress would
establish, would confer citizenship.1 7 In short, although the fram-
ers undoubtedly understood the concept and inserted provisions
relating to it in a few places, the "original Constitution presented
the edifying picture of a government that bestowed rights on peo-
ple and persons, and held itself out as bound by certain standards
of conduct in its relations with people and persons, not with some
legal construct called citizen."0 8 Then came the first historical
accident that dislodged the young nation from this naive reverie,
or, in Bickel's more poetic prose, its "idyllic state of affairs:"109
Dred Scott and the Civil War. 10
The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court served to conflate
two terms meant to be distinct, and in doing so disqualified an
entire race from holding any of the rights and privileges bestowed
on "We the People." This was just the beginning of the story, how-
ever. The innocence of the Constitution's original concept of citi-
zenship had indeed been violated by Taney, and "[a] rape having
occurred, innocence could never be fully restored. But remarkably
enough, after a period of reacting to the trauma, we soon resumed
behaving as if our virginity were intact, and with a fair measure of
103. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (Yale University
Press 1975).
104. Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L.
REV. 369, 369 (1973).
105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (Congressman); art. I § 3 (Senator); art. II, § 1
(President).
106. Id. art. I, § 8.
107. Bickel, supra note 104, at 369 ("They plainly assumed that birth as well as
naturalization would confer citizenship[.]").
108. Id. at 370.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 370-72.
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credibility at that.""' The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited
slavery1 2 and was followed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment, both addressing the issue of who was to
be a citizen."' With the bundle of Section 1 clauses in the Four-
teenth Amendment there was also added that famous statement
that no state shall "abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States"[J" 4 On the verge of establishing a
brave new constitutional order on which much would depend upon
the citizenship of the individual, the second accident of history
occurred reestablishing the mostly irrelevant nature of citizenship
whereby the Privileges and Immunities Clause was stripped of all
meaning and relegated to the dustbin of historical superfluity: 15
the Slaughter House Cases."6 From the original Constitution, to
Dred Scott and through the Slaughter House Cases, a full circle
movement can be discerned: as Bickel writes, "[w]hile we now
have a definition of citizenship in the Constitution, we still set
very little store by it.""
7
Some store, yes, but not much, and with that statement it is
very hard to quarrel. Citizenship is a prerequisite to voting, and
citizenship had served as a basis of discriminating against aliens
in employment and the conferral of other state benefits during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,"' but today, the great
bulwark of liberty and equality-that composed of the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses, guarantees rights to people, not
only citizens."9 And the rub of the matter is this: whereas "people"
represents a real entity on which the government can act and be
prohibited from acting, "[c]itizenship is a legal construct, an
abstraction, a theory.""' Bickel's point, very legitimate and unfor-
tunately born out by the history of this country, is that it is far
easier to see an individual as a person than a "citizen," and by
necessity, far easier to think of someone as a non-citizen than a
111. Id. at 372.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
113. See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§1981-1982 (1991); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
115. Bickel, supra note 104, at 374-80.
116. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
117. Bickel, supra note 104, at 378.
118. See id. at 381 nn.32-35.
119. This is the exact logic the Court has used in Yick Wo, and a point the Court
reiterated in 1971. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971).
120. Bickel, supra note 104, at 387.
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non-person. This, For Bickel is the lesson of Dred Scott:1"'
More generally, emphasis on citizenship as the tie that
binds the individual to government and as the source of his
rights leads to metaphysical thinking about politics and
law, and more particularly to symmetrical thinking, to a
search for reciprocity and symmetry and clarity of uncom-
promised rights and obligations, rationally ranged one next
and against the other. Such thinking bodes ill for the
endurance of free, flexible, responsive and stable institu-
tions, and of a balance between order and liberty ... It is
gratifying, therefore, that we live under a Constitution to
which the concept of citizenship matters very little
indeed.122
Thus, for Bickel, "[c]itizenship is at best a simple idea for a simple
government."123 A good argument, without a doubt, and one with
which I am in total agreement. Nonetheless, even Bickel recog-
nizes one main point, and derides an additional corollary made by
Chief Justice Earl Warren in an opinion, that bears more directly
on the issue of this article. Bickel's main point is to show that
citizenship has not, is not, and should not be the focus of govern-
ment; rather, that focus should be on the persons within the juris-
diction of the state and the state's treatment of those
individuals.'24 If one treats this symbiotic relationship as one
between a state and a person, rather than between a state and the
legal-metaphysical-political entity "citizen," one will never lose
sight of the important moral and political consequences that flow
between the individual and the government. I think this point is
entirely accurate, but its truth relies on one further assumption,
to which Bickel gave only passing reference as the only reason
that citizenship retains a certain importance in our constitutional
system: "The citizen has a right as against the whole world to be
here. The alien does not[.]" "2
The Supreme Court has noted that aliens, whether lawfully
or unlawfully present in the U.S., are "persons" protected by the




124. See id. 369-387.
125. Id. at 382.
126. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S.
590 (1953); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 18 U.S. 356 (1886).
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protections afforded by the Bill of Rights.127 However, even an
alien legally residing in the United States is potentially subject to
removal from the country despite the fact that he is in the closest
position of any alien to the right to remain indefinitely and
unqualifiedly in the U.S.12 In this sense, that citizens are the only
individuals that have an unqualified right to remain within the
country, then citizenship "is man's basic right for it is nothing less
than the right to have rights."'29 Bickel justly derides the hyper-
bole of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Black, in
Perez v. Brownell and other cases, as conflating the concept of "cit-
izenship" with that of "person," as a former Chief Justice had done
a century earlier. 3 ° Yet there is another point here, overlooked in
the rhetoric. Despite the fact that all rights may be secure to per-
sons within U.S. borders, the right to remain, indefinitely and
under no qualifications, is itself a prerequisite to the real enjoy-
ment of all those other rights. To be sure, not much follows from
citizenship if one takes the package in its aggregate; yet that last
point that follows is priceless, and that is the point on which the
jus soli debate turns. Should the children of aliens become citi-
zens, allowing them to stay in the country come hell or high
water? The fact that this right is, for all intents and purposes, the
only important benefit that flows from citizenship, does not dimin-
ish the claim that citizenship itself is an important commodity.
I believe Bickel to be correct in every meaningful sense,
including the clouding effect "citizenship" rhetoric can have on
debates, thus hiding the true costs of any planned action. He
underestimates the importance, mainly because he is of a differ-
ent time, divorced both from the immigration woes of a century
previous and those that confront us in the infancy of the twenty-
first, and therefore did not see the impact the term "citizenship"
could have in certain arenas. I am convinced that citizenship, at
least within these narrow confines, is still worth talking about
and arguing about, so long as we keep in mind the fact that, at
bottom, we are talking about persons. We have not moved far
enough afield of past prejudice and practice, nor close enough to
127. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (relating to First Amendment
rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (Fifth
Amendment's Just Compensation Clause); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (Fifth and
Sixth Amendment protections afforded to resident aliens).
128. See Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. 590.
129. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1957) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
130. Compare United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 731 (1898) (Fuller,
C.J., dissenting) with BICKEL, supra note 100, at 386.
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Bickel's ideal political community, to fully embrace our polity
merely as people, rather than citizens. Until that time, though it
may be sad and frustrating that we are still stuck in our old loops
and terminological distinctions, we must argue from within them
and move forward to what will hopefully be a more enlightened
future. This digression complete, let us proceed.
Every manner of altering thejus soli rule has been advanced,
at some point or another; legislative, judicial, and by way of a con-
stitutional amendment. Variations on the first two themes can be
found in the Dominican Republic's actions, both in the Senate and
Supreme Court of Justice, as well as in Chief Justice Fuller's dis-
sent in Wong Kim Ark. The third possibility is, of course,
grounded firmly and explicitly in the Constitution itself.' In
what follows, I am interested only in whether a certain path could
or should be taken. I will not pass, after this point, on whether I
believe any action is likely, as a constitutional amendment seems
entirely off the table and judicial reinterpretation of a nineteenth
century precedent seems remote. Statutory law restricting the
grant ofjus soli citizenship is an issue in at least one state, Texas,
but it is too early to say what will come of it. Thus, in the subse-
quent three sections, each possibility will be gauged as to permis-
sibility and consistency with our jurisprudentially and
constitutionally iterated notions of law and political morality.
A. Altering Jus Soli by Statute
Congress was given, and still retains, the power to make a
uniform rule regarding naturalization.'32 It has used that power
over the years,'33 but to whatever extent that power could have
been seen as extending prior to 1868, it is, after that period, lim-
ited by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This clause, as has been shown by the foregoing, embodies as an
original and interpretative matter the principle ofjus soli, circum-
scribed only by certain established limitations. Leaving the origi-
nal intent of the framers aside,' the only question is whether
Congress could pass a statute purporting to define citizenship in
such a way as to be consistent with both the language of the Four-
131. U.S. CONST. art. V.
132. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
133. See cases cited supra at note 126.
134. Because "original intent" has been used by both conservative and liberal
justices over the years, defining those two terms broadly and sloppily, I have no idea
which side would wish to appeal to an original understanding in this case, and doubt
whether any side would view the intent as definitive for purposes of adjudication.
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teenth Amendment and the intent to limit the principle ofjus soli.
The main problem with this approach is that by doing so, Con-
gress would be altering a Supreme Court precedent based on its
interpretation of the Constitution. Whatever Congress' powers
are in relation to reversing or altering precedents based on statu-
tory interpretations, to the extent a new or different statute would
effectuate that intent, those powers are far more limited in this
area, if not entirely non-existent. Two relatively recent clashes
between the Court and Congress in relation to attempts to statu-
torily alter the Court's prior constitutional holdings are worth
mentioning to demonstrate the relative futility of Congressional
attempts to bypass constitutional precedents with statutory
reversals.
Seemingly directly on point is the Court's review of Congres-
sional actions and reactions concerning flag burning. In 1989, the
Court struck down as an unconstitutional infringement of the
First Amendment a Texas statute135 making it a crime to dese-
crate a flag. 136 In response to public outrage over the decision,
Congress enacted the Flag Protection Act of 1989.1"' Predictably,
when this statute was presented before the Court, it was struck
down as unconstitutional as well, despite language in the statute
tending to show no intent to actually burden First Amendment
rights.38 A constitutional amendment was not presented to the
states because the Senate was one vote short and that has been
the end of the matter. The Court's interpretation of what is con-
stitutional is supreme, as this case demonstrates.
Less on point, though still of interest, was the debate in the
middle part of the 1990's over the Court's free exercise jurispru-
dence. In Employment Division v. Smith the Court established a
test of constitutionality under the First Amendment that insu-
lated laws of general applicability even if they infringed upon
one's religious freedom.'39 In response to this decision, Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,14° which
dictated that state and federal laws could not substantially bur-
den the free exercise of religion, even if they were of general appli-
135. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (1989).
136. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
137. Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777, invalidated by
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
138. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 310.
139. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
140. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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cability,"' unless there was a compelling governmental interest
and the means chosen were the least restrictive possible.4 2 When
this statute was put in issue, the Court struck it down as an
unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power under the Four-
teenth Amendment, making it inapplicable to the states143,
although it is still valid law vis-A-vis the federal government.'"
Leaving aside these problems, for Congress to even attempt a
legal revamping of the Citizenship Clause it would have to
advance a colorably legitimate interpretation to replace the
Supreme Court's traditional interpretation. The only phrase that
could possibly lend itself to such reinterpretation is that qualify-
ing birth on U.S. soil to the extent that citizenship extends only to
those subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. A limitation
would have to fall within the confines of this language, otherwise
the statute would baldly transcend the limitations the Fourteenth
Amendment is meant to put on legislative action and the Supreme
Court would have, I believe, no problem striking that law down.
Yet, if there is a way to place undocumented aliens outside the
bounds of the "jurisdiction" of the United States, perhaps their
children born here could be legally denied the benefits of U.S. citi-
zenship. To seek such an interpretation however, is only to dig in
the past and rehash arguments previously made and rejected. A
good example is an exchange in the American Law Review from
1895 and 1896, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Wong
Kim Ark, addressing the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 4 5 Justice Field held that children born
to Chinese immigrants on U.S. soil were entitled to U.S.
citizenship.
146
In contrast to the jus soli rule advocated by Justice Field,
George Collins thought the better construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment was that, "upon birth alone, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the nation, citizenship can never be predicated."47
The basis for this opinion-namely that the principle of jus soli
had not been embodied in the text of the Fourteenth Amendment,
nor in the U.S. common law, was the fact that the relation of the
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
143. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
144. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unido do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006).
145. George D. Collins, Citizenship at Birth, 29 AM. L. REV. 385, 386 (1895).
146. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 Fed. 905 (C. C. Cal. 1884).
147. Collins, supra note 145.
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individual to the state was dramatically different than the rela-
tionship of the individual to the lord in the feudal system in which
jus soli had been "birthed."'48 A republican form of government
could not countenance a citizenship rule made for a monarchy.
Collins also understands that the crux of the Citizenship Clause
lies within the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof' and crit-
icizes Justice Field for conflating his interpretation of that clause
and its clear language. This "error" would also be perpetrated by
the Supreme Court itself in Wong Kim Ark: "Judge Field holds
that the only question that can arise relates to the meaning of the
words 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' and he construes that
clause, not as it is written, but as though it is read, 'Subject to the
jurisdiction of the laws thereof,' because, he says, such was the
common law doctrine."'49 Collins sees a difference between being
subject to the jurisdiction of a state and being subject to the juris-
diction of the laws of the state. Jurisdiction simply understood,
and as that term should be understood in the Constitution, relates
to political jurisdiction and not the jurisdiction of laws. 5 ° Applied
directly to the Fourteenth Amendment, this explanation inter-
prets "subject to the jurisdiction thereof' to mean "the jurisdiction
of the nation as such,-the political jurisdiction, and it is but an
affirmative method of expressing the proposition that a person
born in the United States must not at the time of birth be subject
to any foreign power; thus making it indispensable to citizenship
by birth, that the parent be then an American citizen; for other-
wise if he be an alien, the child will be subject to the country of the
father."15" ' Collins in essence reads the Citizenship Clause as
establishing a jus sanguinis rule that applies so long as the child
is born on U.S. soil. Otherwise, Congress can presumably regulate
the grant of citizenship.
Collins's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment was criticized
148. See id. at 386-89. In relation to birthright citizenship, Collin's opined that
"[tihis of course was nothing else but feudalism which, however appropriate to
monarchy, is fundamentally repugnant to republican institutions. It is manifest,
then, that the common law doctrine to the effect that birth within the dominion of the
king, made one a subject, could never apply to a republic, and could never furnish any
analogy in determining a question of American citizenship." Id. at 387.
149. Id. at 389.
150. Id. at 390.
151. Id. at 391. The reference to the child being a citizen of the country of his father
is the result of Collins' referral to the international law consensus rule of jus
sanguinis, where citizenship would follow the father if in wedlock and that of the
mother if illegitimate. See id. at 390-91.
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by Henry C. Ide in the following year.152 Ide first noted the uni-
form practice of the federal government outside the excepted clas-
ses, of granting citizenship to those born on U.S. soil, and stated
that this was contrary to what the rule both before and after the
Fourteenth Amendment had been proposed and adopted.1 53 Col-
lins maintained there is also no generally recognized rule in inter-
national law pertaining to the grant of citizenship."' Rather,
although many countries do follow the doctrine of citizenship by
descent, others, including England, Portugal, Denmark, and Hol-
land, allowed for the establishment of citizenship based on the
principle of jus soli.15 Most importantly however, even if one
accepts that the jurisdiction spoken of in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment refers to political, and not just legal, jurisdiction, there is
still no reason not to read the Clause as advocating jus soli. If
Collins is correct, that subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States means that the child cannot be subject to any foreign
power, is it not also true, as Ide posits, that "the very fact of birth
in our country render one 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' and
'not subject to any foreign power?"'156 Even if the jus sanguinis
citizenship issued depending on the legitimacy of the child, even-
tually a new citizenship would control because the connection
between the child and successive "fathers" would become attenu-
ated.57 All the United States has done, by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is fix that successive birth at one, rather than two, or
three, or four. Nonetheless, as an important limitation, Ide did
not wish to confer citizenship on the child of every alien present in
the United States at the time of birth - domicile and intent must
be taken into account. 58 Thus, "where an alien is actually domi-
ciled in our country, fixed for life as an inhabitant, his original
nationality is so far weakened that our institutions ought not to
consent that its inanimate shadow shall rest upon his offspring
and deprive them of the inherent rights which are theirs by
birth."59 Ide's reading leads him to the conclusion that children
152. Henry C. Ide, Citizenship by Birth - Another View, 30 AM. L. REV. 241 (1896).
153. See id. at 242-44 (noting opinions issued by Secretaries of State and Attorney
Generals before and after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment).
154. Id. at 244-46.
155. Id. at 245.
156. Id. at 248.
157. Id. "All law recognizes the fact that there comes a time when the nationality of
the ancestor has been extinguished, and a new one has taken its place by the mere
fact of a succession of births in another country without naturalization."
158. See id. at 248-49.
159. See id. at 248-49. Nonetheless, Ide would not allow this to hinder the anti-
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born in this country should be deemed citizens thereof because
upon birth they are subject only to the jurisdiction of the United
States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment and not to any
foreign power so long as their parents are not migratory or here on
a non-permanent basis. Essentially, he reads the Dominican
Republic's "in transit" exception into the Fourteenth Amendment
and expands it to a temporal duration that would encompass all
who did not intend to stay.
Collins's view was of course rejected by the Supreme Court
while Ide's, in slightly altered form, was adopted. I can think of no
reason to regress at this point as I also agree that Ide's is the bet-
ter interpretation. Even if one deems political jurisdiction the
operative concept, a child born to aliens in the United States (so
long as they are not diplomats or enemy aliens) is subject to the
political jurisdiction thereof immediately upon birth and not to
that of any foreign power. This operation occurs immediately
from a legal-politico and constitutional perspective, and cannot be
altered by statutory fiat. Thus, although Congress does indeed
have broad powers over naturalization and immigration, includ-
ing the express power to create a uniform rule of naturalization,
this power is circumscribed within the limitations of the Citizen-
ship Clause. That clause bears only one reasonable interpreta-
tion: all qualifying children, i.e., non-diplomat, non-enemy alien
children, born on U.S. soil are citizens thereof. Although Congress
might be able to read the notion of political jurisdiction into the
Constitution by way of statute, Ide's argument is still controlling
and the subjective addition of intent into the clause would be prob-
lematic to say the least, and most likely non-efficacious. Most of
the undocumented aliens in this country seem to be here for good,
and thus an "in transit" or "migratory" exception would, if applied
justly, not reach this class to the extent that advocates would wish
it to do.
In the end, I believe Congress' hands to be tied by what is
more or less clear constitutional language already logically inter-
preted by the Supreme Court. I also believe the Supreme Court
would never cede to Congress the power to interpret the Constitu-
tion in manifest disregard of logical language and prior precedent.
Chinese sentiment of the day: "By the same reasoning, the Chinese are not domiciled
in the United States. They do not expect permanently to remain in [the United
States]. They all look forward to a return, sooner or later, to China. Their original
allegiance has never been weakened. Hence they may consistently be considered to
stand upon an entirely different basis as to their children born here, from other
nationalities." Id. at 250 (alteration in original).
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Chief Justice Fuller's dissent in Wong Kim Ark, advocating for an
interpretation of the Constitution in light of other statutes and
treaties passed by the U.S. government and the Dominican court's
surrender of its judicial mandate in the face of strong public oppo-
sition to Haitian immigration, need not be addressed here. We
are still living in a country where the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land and every statute must measure itself against that
precept. The Supreme Court itself has too much pride to punt in
as disgraceful a way as the Dominican court did, and so there is no
reason to believe Congress would be able to bully a law past the
populace and the Court abrogating the jus soli principle.
B. The Possibility of Amendment
The most "legal" way by which to alter thejus soli principle of
the Citizenship Clause, and by far the least likely, is by way of a
constitutional amendment. I say most "legal" because there is
still talk at times whether certain amendments could themselves
be unconstitutional,' for instance, an amendment outlawing
abortion. Nevertheless, because of supremacy, an amendment
creates a legally definitive end in a way that Congressional stat-
ute-making and Supreme Court interpretation does not. On the
other hand, this option is the least likely culmination of the debate
for obvious reasons; of the thousands of amendments proposed
since the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, only seventeen have
become constitutional amendments. There is little reason to
believe that immigration could garner the support necessary to
overcome the rigorous Article V requirements. Yet, since I have
already stated that permissibility rather than probability is the
name of the game, the issue is worth analyzing.
The content of any proposed amendment would most likely
mirror one of two possibilities. Either it would adopt explicitly a
jus sanguinis theory of citizenship or it could adopt, just as explic-
itly, a tailor-made remedy for undocumented aliens. One pro-
posed remedy grants immediate permanent residency status
rather than citizenship to children born in the United States to
undocumented aliens, thus putting them on the road to citizen-
160. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL.
L. REV. 703 (1979-1980) (analyzing the possibility of legitimately amending the
Constitution so as to restrict certain fundamental rights); Laurence H. Tribe, A
Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 433 (1983) (determining the judiciary's role in the Article V amendment
process).
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ship, by dangling the carrot rather than giving it away ab initio. 6
Leaving aside the question of whether a constitutional amend-
ment could itself be unconstitutional, a limitation concerning
amendments must be at least implicit in the Constitution. For
purposes of this analysis I will concur with the thought of Lau-
rence Tribe,162 among others,6 that an amendment should be con-
sistent with the structure and general import of the constitution
to which it is meant to be appended. Against this vision, amend-
ments related to flag-burning and abortion are often touted as
being too specific and not oriented towards the political vision that
our Constitution embodies. The amendment enacting Prohibition
is cited as a real example of what happens when the amendment
process is utilized to freeze in time the passions of a moment.' So
what would the nature of an amendment relating to jus soli be?
I can think of no objections related to generality and content.
The amendment process has, after all, given us the language to
which some are now objecting. Citizenship is undoubtedly a
proper province of national government. An amendment estab-
lishing jus sanguinis citizenship, or somehow qualifying citizen-
ship for those who are here on a non-permanent or illegal basis,
seems to fit in with most other amendments, as it would be regu-
lating the scope of the U.S. political community. There can be no
objection to such an amendment on the grounds leveled against
other recent proposed amendments. Of course, the Eighteenth
Amendment represents a different problem, one illustrated by the
Dominican experience and highlighted by Baluarte in his article.
The Dominican Senatorial response, proposing constitutional
amendments aimed at eliminating jus soli citizenship, was not
undertaken for any reason relating to traditional systemic politi-
cal revision, but rather from a prejudice directed at the main
group benefiting from the existing regime. For this reason,
Baluarte felt comfortable stating that despite the ostensible "legit-
imacy" of such action, it smacked of bad faith and the perpetua-
161. See Hsieh, supra note 2.
162. See Tribe, supra note 160 (interpreting the Constitution as a document unified
by underlying political ideals).
163. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,
93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Charles B. Kelbley, Are There Limits to Constitutional
Change? Rawls on Comprehensive Doctrines, Unconstitutional Amendments, and the
Basis of Equality, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487 (2004); Douglas Linder, What in the
Constitution Cannot be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1981); Henry Paul
Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996).
164. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
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tion of an institutionalized discrimination.'65 Could anything
different be said of our domestic proposals to alter the constitu-
tional status quo?
Most likely not. The phraseology of any proposed amendment
would be undoubtedly neutral, as would be its operation. All here
would be affected by it in the same way, and there would certainly
be no hint of de jure discrimination. Yet, de facto, would be a dif-
ferent story. The impetus for such an amendment clearly resides
in the influx of undocumented aliens from Mexico and its effect on
our existing cultural milieu. The neutrality of language and appli-
cation would not, and cannot, hide this intent. To enact such an
amendment, no matter how cleverly crafted, would be no better a
response than that envisioned by an angered and xenophobic
Dominican Senate. Simply because such an amendment would
otherwise square with the Constitution as it existed from a politi-
cal perspective and as a subject of constitutionalism, does not
make it a morally legitimate response to the vagaries of selective
political pressures. To the extent that this point, and the entire
justification for this section, resides in a correct assessment of our
political morality, it will be addressed more fully in the closing
paragraphs of this section. For the moment, it suffices to say that
amendment should not be the route by which any perceived prob-
lem is addressed.
C. Reinterpretation by the Supreme Court
Since the prevailing interpretation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in U.S. law is one given to the polity by the Supreme Court,
the most logical place to look for change would be a reevaluation of
the correctness of that decision.166 The overruling of precedent has
always been a solemn task, undertaken for the most part with the
seriousness required of changing a law. Nonetheless, stare decisis
has given way in the last decade in decisions relating to the impo-
sition of capital punishment on juveniles 67 and the mentally
165. See Baluarte, supra note 59, at 25.
166. Obviously, for the Court to undertake such a reinterpretation it would have to
be presented with a concrete case satisfying all the requirements of justiciability and
standing, which could only be the result of the passage and the subsequent challenge
to a local, state, or federal law purporting to limit the jus soli principle. Thus,
reinterpretation is itself a contingent act and in every case, except one dealing with a
potential federal law, the Court would be able to dodge the question on other grounds.
167. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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retard,16 as well as same-sex sodomy. 169 The Court has also revis-
ited some of its other constitutional interpretations in the normal
course of adjudication, most famously in regards to the Commerce
Clause. 170 Although the Court has established a four-part test for
determining when a precedent should be revisited, 1' the test itself
has been manipulated and the overwhelming logic behind the
reversal of the three decisions noted at footnotes 150-152 in this
article seems to be the incorrectness of the original decision more
than any other factor. For sake of covering all potential bases, it
will be worth addressing the present issue from both sides, i.e.,
from the jurisprudential standpoint of the Casey criteria and the
more transcendent perspective of whether the original decision
was in some way wrong or inconsistent with society as it now
stands.
In Casey, the plurality opinion adduced four main inquiries
into the rule of the prior decision in order to determine whether
that rule was outdated and needed to be overruled.' 7 ' The Court
asked whether there was a reliance interest that argued against
overruling, whether the stability of society would be damaged by
removing the rule, whether the law's growth in the intervening
years had rendered the prior rule anachronistic and incompatible
with contemporary society, and whether the premises of fact on
which the prior decision had based its holding had so changed as
to render that holding unsupportable and unjustified as a legiti-
mate conclusion to the issue posed.'73 There is no reliance interest
here as the interpretation would only be prospective and I venture
that nobody would argue that undocumented aliens already pre-
sent have a legitimate reliance interest in having children born
here become U.S. citizens. Passing over the second point for the
time being, the growth of immigration law since the time of Wong
Kim Ark and the growth of law more generally, especially in the
panoply of currently protected constitutional rights, does not
argue against the jus soli principle. If anything, the greater liber-
168. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002).
169. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
170. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (narrowing Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(finding no violation of the Commerce Clause because not an economic activity).
171. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
172. Id. at 854-855.
173. Id. For an opinion as to the legitimacy of how well the Court applied these
principles in this case see id. at 979-1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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alization and constitutionalization of rights and liberties argues in
favor of retaining the principle ofjus soli, which is without a doubt
one of our most liberal constitutionally based ideals. The evolu-
tion of U.S. law has not in any way rendered the principle anach-
ronistic or inconsistent with other provisions.'74 Finally, there is
really no change in the factual premise of the earlier decision.
Our understanding of the principle has not changed, but we wish
to alter it to address current perceived exigencies. This is not a
valid basis for reversal, as one of the reasons we have both stare
decisis and a written constitution is to, as nearly as possible, place
certain decisions outside the realm of the normal political process.
Points one, three, and four simply do not militate for a change in
the established law.
Returning now to the second criteria- whether the stability
of society would be damaged by removing the principle from oper-
ation- I would be dishonest to advance an argument that society
would be irreparably harmed ifjus soli was read out of the Consti-
tution. The United States would still have naturalization laws
and presumably would still grant citizenship under the provision
of jus sanguinis theory. Life, for 99% of the people would remain
exactly the same as it had always been, and outside academic,
political, and legal circles it is doubtful that many people would
even notice such a decision, or if noticing, would not pay attention
to it past the fifteen minutes most people devote to these types of
issues. Jus soli citizenship is not abortion, to state a truism. The
issue does not involve the president claiming executive privi-
lege,175 or the possible publication of classified materials,'76 or the
ability of the states or federal government to ignore Supreme
Court decisions.'77 Nonetheless, a decision on the issue today, in
174. There is also a limited international movement towards more open citizenship
provisions, meaning a move away from pure jus sanguinis principles to provisions
that embrace jus soli, at least in part. See generally Helen Elizabeth Hartnell,
Belonging: Citizenship and Migration in the European Union and in Germany, 24
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 330 (2006); Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving
Role of Immigration Jurisprudence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 185 (1998-1999) Jeannette
Money, Human Rights Norms and Immigration Control, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 497 (1998-1999); John D. Snethen, The Evolution of Sovereignty and
Citizenship in Western Europe: Implications for Migration and Globalization, 8 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 223 (2000-2001); Michael A. Becker, Note, Managing
Diversity in the European Union: Inclusive European Citizenship and Third-Country
Nationals, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 132 (2004).
175. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
176. See New York Times, Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
177. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832) (overruled on other points of law).
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the circumstances we now find ourselves, would not be norma-
tively different from the types of real and potential decisions that
have been derided by all points on the ideological spectrum. Were
there not an influx of Mexican aliens, a high number of them
undocumented, there would be no debate just as there was no
debate in the late nineteenth century until the Chinese came and
the already resident polity decided that they didn't want those
people here. The Chinese "problem" was attacked through politi-
cal channels and for the most part upheld in the legal arena. Yet
even in that politically charged period when the prejudice was
stated explicitly and unequivocally, the Court did not shy away
from its duty of interpreting the Constitution and extending rights
to the Chinese guaranteed to all persons as well as the right ofjus
soli citizenship to their children born here. If the Court were to
forget its duty in this case would there not be at least a ripple of
ramification?
The point is, in other areas of law- abortion, capital punish-
ment, privacy, sexual intimacy and orientation-people scream at
the top of their lungs that a decision one way or the other will
compromise the legitimacy of the institution. Here, there is no
groundswell of legal commentary calling into question Wong Kim
Ark. It was simply the political rhetoric of a time, ensconced in a
neutrality betrayed by the only possible motivation for espousing
this so called reform: xenophobia and racism. In light of the 2000
presidential elections, and the Supreme Court's decision,17 the
legitimacy of the Court likely would not be damaged by a decision
reading jus soli out of the Constitution. Such a decision must be
seen for what it is and what it would be described as if it were an
issue more in tune with what the common citizen cares about,
political in the purest and most pejorative sense of the term.
A reversal of course in relation to the interpretation of the
Citizenship Clause should not be deemed necessary under the
Casey criteria. . Any claim that reversal is necessary must be
politically motivated. Whereas that opinion should not be dis-
counted solely because it is political, in the legal realm its cur-
rency is greatly diminished, if it has any trading value at all.
Moving away from the Casey criteria and whatever justifica-
178. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). On the question of
legitimacy see generally BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce
Ackerman ed., Yale University Press 2002); James L. Gibson et al., The Supreme
Court and the U.S. Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or
Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POLIT. SCI. 535 (2003).
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tions exist for stare decisis in an abstract sense, I am of the (tem-
pered) opinion that if a previous decision is wrong in some
material way it should be overruled. It is this principle that best
informed the Court in its most recent decisions overruling prece-
dents. The prior decisions were wrong either as an original matter
or were made untenable by the development of public morality
since the initial decision. To a greater or lesser degree, this deter-
mination will always be political, and so there are those who
decree the present Court as activist for its decisions in Roper and
Lawrence, juxtaposed against those who believed the initial deci-
sions in Stanford and Bowers were just as incorrect under the
"true" meaning of the Constitution. There is a certain give in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Drocess and Dqual Protection
Clauses that give this debate teeth on both sides. The Citizenship
Clause leaves little flexibility. "All citizens" is an absolute that
runs into none of the interpretative or real world problems that
Justice Black's purported First Amendment absolutism did. Like-
wise, even if "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," has political
rather than legal jurisdiction, it offers the interpretation previ-
ously given by Ide in the section addressing potential congres-
sional reactions. This Clause can only be stretched so far, and any
other interpretation than the one given by the court in Wong Kim
Ark would seem wrong and unfaithful to the logical import of the
language. This thought leads inexorably to its compliment,
namely Wong Kim Ark was right when it was decided and has
remained correct even into the present. There is no reason to
believe the decision is wrong, as the interpretation given by the
Court has roots in the common law and the exact language used
by the Reconstruction Congress, as well as executive and legisla-
tive pronouncements on the subject before and after the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment. If one uses the Roper, Lawrence,
and Atkins decisions as a jurisprudential template for when a line
of analysis must diverge from its history, a potential reinterpreta-
tion of the Citizenship Clause, contra Wong Kim Ark, is simply not
necessitated. There is no indication that the decision is in any
material sense incorrect.
Whatever practical concerns we may have about this princi-
ple, reinterpretation, is simply not required under any theory of
the judicial revisiting of precedent even if there was a practical
and legitimate alternative to what now exists,
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In using the term "political morality," both in the title of this
article and periodically throughout, I mean to emphasize only the
ideals and principles of treatment embodied in the U.S. political
order as a function of constitutional provisions and the interpreta-
tion of such provisions. Despite the often controversial nature of
political morality, namely the competition between rival views of
what the nature of U.S. political morality even is, this notion has
played a significant role in twentieth century law, especially con-
stitutional adjudication and theorizing. It is a political morality
based on norms of equal citizenship and standing in the commu-
nity that allowed the Warren Court to strike down segregation as
unconstitutional despite its semantic conformity with the bland
"equal protection of the laws" language. It was not the Constitu-
tion as such that had been violated by segregation, or to be more
specific, not the clear text, but rather those principles and ideals
that enlightened the meaning of the words actually used. Like-
wise, the Due Process Clause has been given substantive import
not because its language dictates such a result, but because of the
view that such language was meant to embody a principle more
fundamental than process. The three means by which jus soli
could be banished from the U.S. legal lexicon canvassed above are
improper because they are incompatible with our deeper notions
of political morality-of what constitutes equality of treatment
and of how one defines the relationship between person and gov-
ernment. At this point in our constitutional history, reinterpreta-
tion would be a retreat to an earlier time when prejudice was
sanctified by "impartial" laws. Whatever legitimacy Collins' or
Fuller's rule would have had as an original matter, and both are, I
think, misguided, the United States has set itself down a different
path. There is no way consistent with our established political
morality that we could now venture from this course. For better
or worse, jus soli will be a part of our political heritage. Despite
certain problems it will periodically give rise to, it stands as legal
proxy for deeper ideals of liberality embodied in our governmental
structure. This point alone should argue strongly in favor of its
retention.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem with undocumented aliens will not dissipate in
the near future, regardless of which compromise comes out of
executive and Congressional dialogue on the issue, and like most
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immigration issues it will undoubtedly surface again. How many
amnesties have been granted in the past fifty years? Nonetheless,
despite the numerous ways to address the perceived problems,
there are still right ways and wrong ways. By doctrinally explor-
ing the two cases dealt with in this article I hoped to highlight just
that fact and to more firmly set the future of U.S. policy on the
path to "right way" resolution. No matter how unlikely I believe
such a course of action to be in reality, there are no true legal
impediments to greatly restricting the principle of jus soli. Yet,
the whole history of our political morality strongly argues against
such change in the circumstances we now find ourselves in. Such
a change was not even effectuated during the height of anti-Chi-
nese sentiment. To do so now would be to follow the lead of a
dubious forebear in abrogating the more enlightened ideals that
define the nature of our government and polity. That we would do
so without the overt racism and xenophobic sentiments of the
Dominicans, and probably with explicit statements of neutrality,
equality, and rule-of-law rhetoric, should not serve as a cover to
the truly illiberal nature of the solution.
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